

## Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 DODE-00 ERDA-05 AF-08 ARA-06  
CIAE-00 EA-07 PM-04 H-01 INR-07 IO-13 L-03  
NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01  
PRS-01 OES-06 SS-15 USIA-06 /126 R

DRAFTED BY: ACDA/IR:RSTRAND/MAB:TA:WKLAIBER  
APPROVED BY: ACDA/IR:WSTEARMAN  
EUR/RPM:JGREENWALD  
DOD/ISA:RDARILEK  
ACDA/IR/REG:MHUMPHREYS  
DOD/ISA:HDUNLOP

-----212027Z 028414 /47/40

R 190421Z MAR 77  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS  
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
AMEMBASSY BERLIN  
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST  
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST  
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN  
AMEMBASSY MADRID  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
AMEMBASSY SOFIA  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW  
AMEMBASSY BERN  
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM  
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

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C O R R E C T E D COPY (PARA 3, LINE 1 OMITTED)

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E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: CSCE, PARM

SUBJECT: US/UK ARMS CONTROL BILATERALS: CSCE CBMS

1. SUMMARY. US-UK DISCUSSION OF CBMS MARCH 15 DEALT MAINLY WITH POSSIBLE NEW MEASURES FOR ALLIED SPONSORSHIP AT BELGRADE CSCE CONFERENCE. IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW SHOULD BE FOCUS OF BELGRADE MEETING AND THAT ANY NEW ALLIED PROPOSALS SHOULD BE LIMITED ACCORDINGLY. UK SAID CBMS SHOULD NOT BECOME ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN. US SAID IT WAS STILL CONSIDERING PROS AND CONS OF STRENGTHENING CBM ON NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS. UK REP WONDERED WHETHER ALLIES MIGHT PICK UP SWEDISH PROPOSAL FOR PUBLICATION OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES IF SWEDES DECIDED NOT TO PUT IT FORWARD THEMSELVES AT BELGRADE. END SUMMARY.

2. AS PART OF US-UK BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, HELD IN ACDA MARCH 14-15, US AND UK OFFICIALS DISCUSSED TREATMENT OF CBMS AT UPCOMING BELGRADE CSCE FOLLOW-ON CONFERENCE. US SIDE WAS LED BY WILLIAM STEARMAN, ACTING ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, ACDA, AND INCLUDED REPRESENTATIVES OF STATE, DOD AND ACDA. UK PARTICIPANTS WERE FCO DEFENSE DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR WILBERFORCE, FCO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT HEAD EDMONDS, AND MOD REP HARTE (HEAD OF DS22).

3. IN OPENING STATEMENT, STEARMAN SAID US VALUES CBMS AS MEANS OF BRINGING ABOUT SOMEWHAT GREATER OPENNESS ON PART OF SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES IN CONDUCT OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. HE NOTED MODESTLY ENCOURAGING IMPLEMENTATION RECORD TO DATE AND SAID NEED TO IMPROVE IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD BE PRINCIPAL ALLIED THEME AT BELGRADE. AT SAME TIME, FOR BOTH

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SUBSTANTIVE AND TACTICAL REASONS, ALLIES SHOULD BE READY TO ADVANCE A LIMITED NUMBER OF NEW CBM PROPOSALS. THIS WOULD DEMONSTRATE TO NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED THE ALLIES' INTEREST IN SECURITY ASPECT OF CSCE AND COULD SERVE AS COUNTERWEIGHT TO WARSAW PACT'S PROPAGANDISTIC NUCLEAR NON-FIRST-USE PROPOSAL.

4. ENSUING DISCUSSION DEALT MAINLY WITH POSSIBLE NEW CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES (CBMS) TO BE ADVANCED BY THE WESTERN ALLIES AT THE CSCE FOLLOW-ON CONFERENCE IN BELGRADE LATER THIS YEAR. BOTH SIDES SAW MERIT IN MEASURES WHICH WOULD BRING ABOUT NOTIFICATION OF GROUND MANEUVERS INVOLVING MORE THAN 10,000 TROOPS, EXPAND THE INFORMATION GIVEN IN MANEUVER NOTIFICATIONS, AND ESTABLISH RULES TO ASSURE THAT OBSERVERS INVITED TO MANEUVERS ARE ALLOWED TO SEE A SIGNIFICANT PART OF WHAT IS GOING ON.

5. WILBERFORCE WENT ON TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS WHICH IMPELLED THE UK ON CBMS. PERSON-

ALLY, HE REGARDED THE MILITARY VALUE OF CBMS AS NIL. THE UK WOULD NOT WANT TO SEE CBMS BECOME AN ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN.

6. WE SAID USG WAS STILL CONSIDERING PROS AND CONS OF A CBM REQUIRING PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS. WE SAID SUCH A MEASURE WOULD EXPAND THE SCOPE OF PACT MILITARY ACTIVITY SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION; IT MIGHT IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE INHIBITING EFFECT ON SOVIETS IN THEIR POLICING OF EASTERN EUROPE; IT WOULD APPEAL STRONGLY TO THE CSCE NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED; AND SOME FELT THAT, PROPERLY DEFINED, IT COULD ADD TO THE COMPLICATIONS FOR THE EAST IN ACHIEVING SURPRISE IN A BREAKOUT ATTEMPT AND HENCE HAVE SOME VALUE FOR DETERRENCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, TO BE ACCEPTABLE IT WOULD HAVE TO BE SO DESIGNED AS NOT TO REDUCE US OR NATO FLEXIBILITY IN DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES; THESE WERE DANGERS ABOUT WHICH THE US

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MILITARY AND THE NATO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STAFF WERE JUSTLY CONCERNED.

7. HARTE SAID HMG WOULD BE "QUITE RELAXED" ABOUT A REQUIREMENT TO NOTIFY MOVEMENTS AT THE DIVISION LEVEL AS LONG AS IT APPLIED TO GROUND FORCES ALONE. RECALLING POTENTIALLY EMBARRASSING SITUATION WHICH HAD ARISEN FROM UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE US POSITION ON A MOVEMENTS CBM DURING NEGOTIATION

OF THE FINAL ACT, WILBERFORCE SAID THE OTHER ALLIES WOULD WANT TO BE SURE OF US SUPPORT BEFORE TAKING AN INITIATIVE ON MOVEMENTS AT BELGRADE.

8. AMONG OTHER MEASURES WHICH VARIOUS NEUTRAL OR NON-ALIGNED CSCE STATES HAVE MENTIONED AS POSSIBLE NEW CBMS, WE SAID US FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY ANY WHICH WOULD MERIT ALLIED SUPPORT EXCEPT PERHAPS SWEDISH PROPOSAL FOR PUBLICATION OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES. IT SEEMED, HOWEVER, THAT THE SWEDES HAD NOW DECIDED NOT TO ADVANCE THIS PROPOSAL AT BELGRADE BECAUSE OF THE STRENGTH OF SOVIET OPPOSITION TO IT ("A PERFECTLY NEUTRAL POSITION," QUIPPED ONE OF THE BRITISH). THE BRITISH (EDMONDS) AGREED PROPOSAL HAD MERIT AND WONDERED WHETHER IT MIGHT NOT BE A GOOD IDEA FOR THE ALLIES TO PUT IT FORWARD AT BELGRADE THEMSELVES. WE SAID THAT WHILE THIS COULDN'T BE RULED OUT IT WOULD PRESENT PROBLEMS: SWEDES HAD SPONSORED THE PROPOSAL IN OTHER FORUMS AND MIGHT HAVE PROPRIETARY FEELINGS ABOUT IT; MORE IMPORTANT, IT DIFFERED FROM PROPOSALS PRESENTLY BEING CONSIDERED FOR ALLIED SPONSORSHIP AT BELGRADE IN THAT IT WOULD CONSTITUTE NOT A STRENGTHENING OR EXTENSION OF EXISTING CBMS BUT A COMPLETELY NEW MEASURE.

9. WE NOTED THAT IN DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE ALLIED CBM INITIATIVES IT SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN THAT PRIMARY FOCUS AT BELGRADE MUST BE A REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT, THAT CONSISTENT WITH THIS THE ALLIES WOULD WANT  
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TO PUT FORWARD ONLY A LIMITED NUMBER OF NEW PROPOSALS, AND THAT THESE WOULD HAVE TO BE DISTRIBUTED FAIRLY EVENLY AMONG THE THREE CSCE BASKETS.  
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## Message Attributes

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